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RESEARCH BRIEF 
 




How plots come to fail or to be foiled is of great importance to the study of terrorism and to the development of counterterrorism 
policy. There can be no comprehensive picture of the threat without analyzing what adversaries planned to do as well as what 
they actually managed to accomplish. Examining failed and foiled plots is essential to understanding their intentions as well as 
their capabilities. This specific project, “Comparing Failed, Foiled, Completed and Successful Terrorist Attacks,” examines 




This brief summarizes research on 121 jihadist plots against the United States between 1993 and 2017. Each of the plots is 
coded as to whether it was completed, successful, failed or foiled. These variables are independent of one another and a single 
plot can be coded with any combination of these variables. It is therefore possible for some elements of a plot to be failed and 
other elements of the same plot foiled, completed or successful. 
 
 Completed: These are plots in which the actions intended by the perpetrator were carried out to their final stage of 
implementation, whether or not they had their intended physical impact. 
 Successful: These are plots that achieved the kinetic action that was planned, regardless of the outcome in number of 
deaths, the response to the attack or the long-term consequences. 
 Failed: These are plots that were unsuccessful because of something the would-be perpetrators did, a factor internal to 
the plot – either they made a mechanical mistake or they had a change of intention. 
 Foiled: These are plots that were unsuccessful because of some kind of intervention, whether from members of the 
public, friends or family, or by government authorities; in the United States this is usually FBI or local or state law 
enforcement, sometimes with the assistance of the intelligence agencies of foreign governments. 
 
The analysis of research and data from the project can be used to curate a better understanding of the process of either foiling 
or completing a terrorist attack, and how intervention can increase the number of foiled attacks as compared to completed or 
successful attacks. This research brief outlines some of the key findings, focusing on trends and case studies from the data 




FREQUENCY AND OUTCOMES 
 
Since the February 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center, there have been 121 jihadist-linked 
plots to use violence against the American 
homeland. Only 15 of these plots were 
completely successful, with an additional seven 
that were partially successful and partially foiled; 
one that was partially successful and partially 
failed; and two that contained elements of 
success, with further aspects of the attack that 
were both failed and foiled.  
 
The number of attempted and successful plots 
has increased in recent years, both in the United 
States and in the other countries studied, with a 
steep increase after 2010. 
Frequency of successful and foiled attacks by year (1993-2016). 
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However, most U.S. jihadist plots were completely 
or partially foiled (82%), and most of those foiled 
plots involve government surveillance and/or 
government informants who enter the plot at an 
early stage. Surveillance is also the most frequent 
route to disruption outside the United States. 
Despite the dominance of early government 
intervention, in 13 cases, community tip offs and 
in three cases, family tip offs, set the investigation 
in motion. 
 
Of the 16 cases that involved a failure of plans, six 
failed completely, three had elements of success, 
and seven also involved interventions that foiled 
the plot. 
 
STAGES OF DISCOVERY AND PROGRESS 
 
This project defined and identified five distinct plot stages, for both discovery and implementation, with an additional stage in 
discovery to code those cases where the plot was not discovered until “after the fact,” that is, for example, when the plot was 
discovered only as a result of an arrest made for other reasons. These stages include the perpetrators’ initial communication of 
intent, attempts to acquire capabilities, practice and training for an attack, specification of target and method, and the final 
implementation stage (the “out the door” phase, such as placing a bomb at the target).1 
 
Most plots in the United States that are foiled are intercepted at a very early stage. Aside from the stings, relatively few cases 
had progressed very far before they were stopped, showing that the early detection of intent has proved successful for U.S 
cases, albeit with associated criticism related to the possibility of entrapment. 
 
 Of the 114 plots that had enough information to determine the stage of discovery, about a quarter (30) were 
discovered at the point at which they were being implemented, although not all of these turned out to be “successful.” 
 A total of 61 plots were discovered at the stage of communication of intent, and of these 13 were halted there, with 
another 21 stopped as the would-be perpetrators sought to acquire capability for their attack.  
o Of the plots that were known about at the stage of communicating intent, 14 plots still ran until they had a plan 
laid out, likely in order to collect enough evidence for a prosecution, and a further 12 were stopped at the final 
point of implementation.  
o Most of these 12 cases involved undercover officers, who provided inert weapons and waited until the 





                                                          
1 The progression is not necessarily linear; sometimes targets and methods are selected before an attempt to acquire 
capabilities, for example. 
Plot Progress 
 














13 0 0 0 0 1 14 
Acquiring 
Capability 
21 9 0 0 0 0 30 
Practice and 
training 
1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Plan Laid Out 14 4 0 6 0 2 26 
Implementation 12 0 0 0 30 0 42 
Total 61 13 1 6 30 3 114 
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PERPETRATORS 
 
The data show that after an early period when al-Qaida was the major threat, the United States came to face a disaggregated 
“homegrown” threat from small groups or individuals who were not actual agents of the organizations the United States and the 
West were fighting in Afghanistan, the Middle East or Africa. However, it should be noted that the attackers or plotters may 
believe that they were members of such groups or may have been inspired by the group’s ideological appeals. 
 
 Most U.S. perpetrators of jihadist plots are young men who are American citizens or residents – 81.7 percent of U.S. 
perpetrators were residents of the United States; few returned foreign fighters are among them. 
 Most jihadist plots against the U.S. homeland do not involve large numbers of conspirators; two thirds of the attacks or 
planned attacks (66.7%) involved only one person and a further 16.7 percent involved only two people. 
 True “lone wolves,” individuals who acted without direct outside guidance or face-to-face interaction with fellow 
conspirators or people they assumed to be like-minded followers of the jihadist cause, were rare (14% of plots), but 
they were more likely to be successful than perpetrators working in teams, with 63.2 percent of those classified as lone 
wolves, or possible lone wolves, having some success in accomplishing plots.  
 Where religion was known, most perpetrators of jihadist plots in the United States were Muslims from birth (70.7%), but 
there was also a significant portion of Muslim converts (24%) and a small percentage (5.3%) who were not Muslim at 
all.  
 Many of the individuals in this dataset explained their motive as opposition to the American use of military force against 
Muslims in civil conflicts abroad.  
 
LOCATIONS, TARGETS AND MODES OF ATTACKS 
 
Almost 30 percent of all U.S. jihadist plots were meant to, or did, occur in New York or its surrounding metropolitan area. Next 
most frequent was D.C. or Virginia, accounting for 16.8 percent of plots, followed by Florida, California, Texas and Illinois.  
 
Almost half of the U.S. plots were carried out with or planned to involve explosives and almost a third of all plots were armed 
assaults. Comparing foiled and successful attacks in the United States showed more foiled bombings and more successful 
armed assaults. The majority of plots were directed at private citizens, whether in public spaces, using public transport or at 





The dataset used in this report was constructed from public sources on successful, as well as failed and foiled, jihadist attempts 
to use violence against the homelands of the United States and its Western allies since the first bombing of the World Trade 
Center in 1993. These sources include not only news outlets but also government documents including Department of Justice 
and FBI statements. For U.K. cases, Crown Prosecution documents were also consulted. It is acknowledged that any data 
derived from public sources may omit information known only to intelligence agencies; however, such are the constraints for 




The research has identified a number of areas for important future research. There appear to be some aspects of the U.S. 
attacks or plots and their perpetrators that make them distinctive from those happening in the allied countries examined. 
Future research is needed to better understand issues surrounding attack team membership, the numbers of U.S. converts 
identified and the role of thwarted attempts to travel to overseas conflicts in predicting future action at home.  
 
Further comparative analysis is needed in order to understand whether the forms of attack and the targets selected are 
different to specific allied countries, rather than all other countries combined. The recent rise in vehicle attacks merits further 
research in its own right, as does the extent to which modes of attack are changing over time. In regard to early detection of 
terrorist plots, further research is needed into specific forms of surveillance, the role of tips offs, and the efficacy of general 









START Research Brief © University Of Maryland, December 2017 4 
 
Martha Crenshaw | Senior Fellow | Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) | Professor of Political Science | 
Stanford University 
 
Erik Dahl | Associate Professor of National Security Affairs | Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Margaret Wilson | Honorary Senior Research Fellow | Imperial College London 
 
To provide feedback, or for any correspondence relating to this research, or for a copy of the full report on this topic, please 




The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) is supported in part by the Science and Technology 
Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through a Center of Excellence program based at the University of Maryland. START 
uses state‐of‐the‐art theories, methods and data from the social and behavioral sciences to improve understanding of the origins, dynamics 
and social and psychological impacts of terrorism. For more information, contact START at infostart@start.umd.edu or visit 
www.start.umd.edu.  
 
This research was supported by the Science and Technology Directorate of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through awards made 
to the START and the authors. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted 
as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or START.  
 
